


**EXAMINATION 4 VERSION A**  
**“General Equilibrium and Market Power”**  
**November 19, 2024**

**INSTRUCTIONS:** This exam is closed-book, closed-notes. Calculators, mobile phones, and wireless devices are NOT permitted. Point values for each question are noted in brackets.

**I. MULTIPLE CHOICE:** Circle the one best answer to each question. Feel free to use margins for scratch work [1 pt each—14 pts total].

The next three questions refer to the following Edgeworth box diagram for production. The solid curves are Firm 1's isoquants. The dashed curves are Firm 2's isoquants.



- (1) From allocation A, *both* firms can produce more output if
- Firm 1 gives Firm 2 some capital, and Firm 2 gives Firm 1 some labor.
  - Firm 1 gives Firm 2 some labor, and Firm 2 gives Firm 1 some capital.
  - Firm 1 gives Firm 2 some capital and some labor.
  - Firm 2 gives Firm 1 some capital and some labor.
  - No trade will allow both firms to produce more output.

- (2) From allocation B, *both* firms can produce more output if
- Firm 1 gives Firm 2 some capital, and Firm 2 gives Firm 1 some labor.
  - Firm 1 gives Firm 2 some labor, and Firm 2 gives Firm 1 some capital.
  - Firm 1 gives Firm 2 some capital and some labor.
  - Firm 2 gives Firm 1 some capital and some labor.
  - No trade will allow both firms to produce more output.

- (3) Firms 1 and 2 have identical marginal rates of substitution in production at
- allocation A only.
  - allocation B only.
  - both allocations A and B.
  - neither allocation A nor B.


- (4) The so-called “First Welfare Theorem” of general equilibrium theory states that
- if all markets are competitive, then everyone enjoys the same income.
  - competitive forces push the economy toward the corners of the Edgeworth box.
  - any competitive equilibrium is on the contract curve.
  - all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

(5) Suppose a sandwich vendor with market power is now selling 10 sandwiches per hour at a price of \$8. If she cuts the price to \$7.50, she can sell one more sandwich per hour (that is, a total of 11 sandwiches per hour). The vendor's marginal revenue for the eleventh sandwich is therefore

- zero.
- \$0.50.
- \$2.50.
- \$6.50.
- \$7.50.
- \$8.00.

- (6) A "natural monopoly" is a firm that enjoys
- patent protection.
  - an exclusive government franchise allowing it alone to sell the product.
  - exclusive ownership of a natural resource essential for producing the product.
  - a downward-sloping average cost curve.

The next two questions refer to the graph of a monopolist below.



(7) What quantity of output will the monopolist choose if it must charge the *same* price to all customers?

- 0 units.
- 20 units.
- 40 units.
- 60 units.
- 80 units.

(8) What quantity of output will the monopolist choose if it can engage in *perfect price discrimination*, setting a different price for each unit according to willingness-to-pay?

- 0 units.
- 20 units.
- 40 units.
- 60 units.
- 80 units.

(9) Suppose all firms in an industry have the same marginal cost. According to the Cournot model of oligopoly, the equilibrium price will be higher,

- the more firms in the industry.
- the fewer firms in the industry.
- The price does not depend on the number of firms in the industry.

(10) Which market model predicts the largest quantity of total output?

- Price competition.
- Collusion to maximize joint profits.
- Cournot oligopoly.
- All models predict the same quantity of output, if all use the same assumptions about market demand and marginal cost.


(11) Suppose consumers do not view restaurants as perfect substitutes. For example, some consumers prefer Chinese food, some prefer Italian food, etc. Then restaurant cuisines are said to be \_\_\_\_\_ products.

- complementary.
- differentiated.
- normal.
- efficient.
- elastic.

(12) Which of the following characterizes a Nash equilibrium of a game?

- The sum of the payoffs for both players is maximized.
- Neither player wants to change strategies unilaterally.
- Neither player can be made better off without the other player being made worse off.
- Each player is receiving the highest possible payoff in the game.

The next two questions refer to the following graph of a representative firm under monopolistic competition in long run equilibrium.



(13) Long-run equilibrium quantity for this firm is about


- 20 units of output.
- 40 units of output.
- 60 units of output.
- 80 units of output.
- 100 units of output.

(14) Long-run equilibrium profit for this firm is about

- zero .
- \$4 .
- \$6 .
- \$80 .
- \$160 .
- \$240 .

**II. SHORT ANSWER:** Please write your answers in the boxes on this question sheet. Use margins for scratch work.

(1) [General equilibrium: 8 pts] Consider the graph at right of an economy's production-possibility curve. Assume this economy is in general competitive equilibrium at point A, where the slope of the production-possibility curve is  $-1/2$ .



- What is the opportunity cost of a unit of clothing? In other words, how many units of food must be given up in order to produce one more unit of clothing?
- What is the opportunity cost of a unit of food? In other words, how many units of clothing must be given up in order to produce one more unit of food?
- Consider the typical consumer's budget line with food on the vertical axis and clothing on the horizontal axis. What must be the slope of every consumer's budget line in this economy?
- If the price of a unit of food is \$ 4, then what must be the price of a unit of clothing?

	units of food
	units of clothing
\$	

(2) [Monopoly price discrimination: 4 pts] Suppose an ice rink believes that the elasticity of demand for admission by adults is  $-2$ , and the elasticity of demand by children is  $-6$ . Assume the ice rink has a marginal cost of \$10 per admission.


- Compute the ice rink's profit-maximizing admission price for adults.
- Compute the ice rink's profit-maximizing admission price for children.

\$
\$

(3) [Lerner index of market power: 4 pts] The Lerner index of market power is defined as the fraction of price that represents a markup over marginal cost:  $L = (P-MC)/P$ . Suppose a particular airline route has a price elasticity of demand of  $-2$ .

- Compute the Lerner index if this market is a monopoly.
- Compute the Lerner index if this market is a symmetric Cournot duopoly of two airlines.


(4) [Collusion/joint profit maximization: 16 pts] Three firms produce vitamins. Market demand and the three firms' joint marginal cost are shown in the graph below.



First, suppose these firms engage in price competition.

- Compute competitive equilibrium market price.
- Compute competitive equilibrium market quantity.
- Compute the amount of deadweight loss.

\$	
	thousand
\$	thousand

Now suppose these firms form a cartel to maximize jointly the sum of their profits. The equation for demand is  $P = 14 - Q$ , where  $Q =$  quantity in thousands.

- Find the equation for the cartel's marginal revenue.

MR =

- Carefully plot and label the cartel's marginal revenue curve in the graph above.

- What price will the firms jointly set?
- How much output will the firms produce, in total?
- Compute the amount of deadweight loss.

\$	
	thousand
\$	thousand

(5) [Game theory: 12 pts] An industry consists of two firms, A and B. Each firm chooses a low price or a high price. Payoffs are shown in the following game in normal (or strategic) form.

		Firm B	
		High price	Low price
Firm A	High price	Firm A's profit = \$10 million Firm B's profit = \$10 million	Firm A's profit = \$1 million. Firm B's profit = \$15 million.
	Low price	Firm A's profit = \$15 million. Firm B's profit = \$1 million.	Firm A's profit = \$2 million. Firm B's profit = \$2 million.

a. Which outcomes of this game (if any) are Pareto-efficient<sup>1</sup>? Answer "YES" or "NO."

Firm A plays "High price" and Firm B plays "High price"	
Firm A plays "Low price" and Firm B plays "Low price"	
Firm A plays "High price" and Firm B plays "Low price"	
Firm A plays "Low price" and Firm B plays "High price"	

b. Which outcomes of this game (if any) are dominant-strategy equilibria<sup>2</sup>? Answer "YES" or "NO."

Firm A plays "High price" and Firm B plays "High price"	
Firm A plays "Low price" and Firm B plays "Low price"	
Firm A plays "High price" and Firm B plays "Low price"	
Firm A plays "Low price" and Firm B plays "High price"	

c. Which outcomes of this game (if any) are Nash equilibria in pure strategies? Answer "YES" or "NO."


Firm A plays "High price" and Firm B plays "High price"	
Firm A plays "Low price" and Firm B plays "Low price"	
Firm A plays "High price" and Firm B plays "Low price"	
Firm A plays "Low price" and Firm B plays "High price"	

<sup>1</sup> Ignore the welfare of consumers.

<sup>2</sup> "Equilibria" is the plural form of "equilibrium."

**III. PROBLEMS:** Please write your answers in the boxes on this question sheet. Show your work and circle your final answers.

(1) [Exchange efficiency: 12 pts] Xavier and Yolanda both like turkey ( $q_1$ ) and pumpkin pie ( $q_2$ ). Xavier's utility function is  $U_X = q_1^5 q_2$ . Yolanda's utility function is  $U_Y = q_1 q_2^3$ . A total of 4 servings of turkey and 6 slices of pumpkin pie must be divided between them. Consider the allocations depicted in the Edgeworth box below.



a. Is allocation A Pareto-efficient? Why or why not?

b. Is allocation B Pareto-efficient? Why or why not?

c. Is allocation C Pareto-efficient? Why or why not?

d. Is allocation D Pareto-efficient? Why or why not?

e. Is allocation E Pareto-efficient? Why or why not?

f. Sketch and label the contract curve in the Edgeworth box above.

(2) [Monopoly, profit maximization: 14 pts] Suppose a monopolist has total cost function given by  $TC(Q) = 4Q + (Q^2/20)$ . This monopolist faces a demand curve given by  $P = 10 - (Q/10)$ . Show your work and circle your final answers. Note: question continues on next page. Use graph at bottom of next page for scratch work.

- a. Find the monopolist's marginal cost function.

- b. Find the monopolist's average cost function.

- c. Find the monopolist's marginal revenue function.

- d. Compute the monopolist's profit-maximizing level of output  $Q_M$ .

- e. Compute the monopolist's profit-maximizing price  $P_M$ .



f. Compute the monopolist's profit.

g. Compute the social deadweight loss caused by the monopolist. (You may use the graph for scratch work.)



(3) [Cournot duopoly: 14 pts] Suppose two makers of a consumer good form a symmetric Cournot duopoly, each firm setting its own quantity while taking the other firm's quantity as given. Let  $q_1$  = firm #1's quantity and  $q_2$  = firm #2's quantity, so that total market quantity  $Q = q_1 + q_2$ . The market demand curve is  $P = 15 - (Q/10)$ . Each firm has constant marginal and average cost equal to \$3. Show your work and circle your final answers. Note: question continues on next page. Use graph at bottom of next page for scratch work.

- a. Find an expression for firm #1's revenue, as a function of its own quantity and the quantity produced by the other firm:  $TR_1(q_1, q_2)$ .

- b. Find an expression for firm #1's marginal revenue, as a function of its own quantity and the quantity produced by the other firm:  $MR_1(q_1, q_2)$ .

- c. Find an expression for firm #1's reaction function, showing how much firm #1 will produce for any given quantity set by the other firm:  $q_1^* = f(q_2)$ .

- d. Assume the equilibrium is symmetric (that is, assume  $q_1^* = q_2^*$ ) and compute firm #1's equilibrium quantity  $q_1^*$ .

e. Compute total market quantity  $Q^*$  and the equilibrium price  $P^*$ .

f. Compute the combined total profit of both firms.

g. Compute the social deadweight loss.



**IV. CRITICAL THINKING:** Answer just *one* question below (your choice). [4 pts]

- (1) Consider an Edgeworth box for two people who happen to have identical utility functions. Will the contract curve pass through the exact center of the Edgeworth box? Why or why not? [Hint: Do these two people have identical MRSC functions? At the center of the box, how are the goods divided?]
- (2) Give the expression for a monopolist's marginal revenue (MR) in terms of the demand elasticity ( $\epsilon$ ). Would a monopolist ever choose a quantity on the *inelastic* ( $-1 < \epsilon < 0$ ) part of its demand curve? Why or why not?

Circle the question you are answering and write your answer below. Full credit requires good grammar, legible writing, accurate spelling, and correct reasoning.

[end of exam]