




(2) [Equilibrium entry: 25 pts] Suppose annual demand for screwdrivers is given by  $P = 25 - (Q/10)$ , average and marginal cost is \$1, and the market is a (symmetric) Cournot oligopoly. It can be shown that the equilibrium market quantity depends on the number of firms as follows.

Number of firms	Equilibrium market quantity	Equilibrium market price	Annual profit per firm	PDV profit per firm
1	120	\$	\$	\$
2	160	\$	\$	\$
3	180	\$	\$	\$
4	192	\$	\$	\$
5	200	\$	\$	\$

- Compute the equilibrium market price when the number of firms ranges from 1 through 5. Insert your answers in the table above.
- Compute the annual profit per firm when the number of firms ranges from 1 through 5. Insert your answers in the table above.
- Suppose this annual profit continues indefinitely and the firms' discount rate is 10%. Compute the present discounted value of profit per firm when the number of firms ranges from 1 through 5. Insert your answers in the table above. [Hint: The present discounted value of a perpetual annual payment of  $X$  at discount rate  $r$  is given by  $X/r$ .]
- What is the equilibrium number of firms in this industry when the upfront cost of entry is \$5000?
- What is the equilibrium number of firms in this industry when the upfront cost of entry is \$2000?


(3) [Entry barriers and contestable markets: 39 pts] The graph below shows a market where the incumbent firm now produces seven million units of output and charges a price of \$7. The average cost curve applies to both the incumbent and any other firm that tries to enter this market.



a. What is minimum average cost?

\$
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b. What is the minimum efficient scale?

million
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c. Assume  $MC=AC$  and compute the incumbent's Lerner index (or "price-cost margin"). [Hint: By definition, the Lerner index =  $(P-MC)/P$ .]

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First, suppose a second firm enters the market and produces three million units of output. Assume the Bain-Sylos postulate: the incumbent firm keeps its output level fixed at seven million and lets the market price fall.

d. What is the new market price?

\$
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e. What is the entrant's average cost?

\$
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f. Does the entrant make a profit or a loss?

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g. How much?

\$ million
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Alternatively, suppose a second firm enters the market and offers a price of \$6. Do not assume the Bain-Sylos postulate. Instead assume the market is contestable and the incumbent firm keeps its price fixed at \$7.

h. What is the entrant's quantity?

million
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i. What is the entrant's average cost?

\$
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j. Does the entrant make a profit or a loss?

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k. How much?

\$ million
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l. What price *should* the incumbent set to prevent entry?

\$
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m. Compute the incumbent's Lerner index (or "price-cost margin") assuming it sets price as in part (l).

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**II. Critical thinking** [9 pts]

Suppose a market is currently served by only one firm, Firm A, whose average and marginal cost is \$5, but whose price is currently \$8. Firm B, with similar costs, is considering entering the market. To preserve its monopoly, Firm A tells Firm B that if Firm B enters the market, then Firm A will lower the price to \$4 to make sure that Firm B loses money. Is this threat *credible*? Why or why not? Define "credible threat" before answering this question.

[end of quiz]